Improper authorization in Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.

A local privilege escalation vulnerability exists in snap-confine, a set-capabilities core component used internally by Canonical snapd to construct the secure execution environment for snap applications. This vulnerability uniquely affects versions of snap-confine configured with set-capabilities (rather than standard set-uid-root installations). Due to a flaw in how privilege boundaries or security sandboxes are initialized when the binary runs under limited ambient capabilities, a local, unprivileged attacker can exploit this behavior to bypass intended restrictions and execute arbitrary code. Successful exploitation allows the local user to elevate their privileges to full root authority.

Improper authorization in Azure Portal allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.

Zimbra Collaboration (ZCS) 10 before 10.0.18 and 10.1 before 10.1.13 allows Classic UI stored XSS via Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) @import directives in an HTML e-mail message.

Deserialization of untrusted data in Microsoft Office SharePoint allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.

An authentication bypass vulnerability in the Check Point SmartConsole login process allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to obtain an application login token and use it to authenticate with full administrative privileges. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to modify security policies and security configurations. Remote exploitation requires internet access to the Management Server IP address and a configuration that does not restrict Trusted Clients. Check Point is aware that this vulnerability is being exploited and has affected a very small number of customers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/rt: Have RT_PUSH_IPI be default off for non PREEMPT_RT RT migration is done aggressively. When a CPU schedules out a high priority RT task for a lower priority task, it will look to see if there's any RT tasks that are waiting to run on another CPU that is of higher priority than the task this CPU is about to run. If it finds one, it will pull that task over to the CPU and allow it to run there instead. Normally, this pulling is done by looking at the RT overloaded mask (rto) which contains all the CPUs in the scheduler domain with RT tasks that are waiting to run due to a higher priority RT task currently running on their CPU. The CPU that is about to schedule a lower priority task will grab the rq lock of the overloaded CPU and move the RT task from that CPU's runqueue to the local one and schedule the higher priority RT task. This caused issues when a lot of CPUs would schedule a lower priority task at the same time. They would all try to grab the same runqueue lock of the CPU with the overloaded RT tasks. Only the first CPU that got in will get that task. All the others would wait until they got the runqueue lock and see there's nothing to pull and do nothing. On systems with lots of CPUs, this caused a large latency (up to 500us) which is beyond what PREEMPT_RT is to allow. The solution to that was to create an RT_PUSH_IPI logic. When any CPU wanted to pull a task, instead of grabbing the runqueue lock of the overloaded CPU, it would start by sending an IPI to the overloaded CPU, and that IPI handler would have the CPU with the waiting RT task do a push instead. Then that handler would send an IPI to the next CPU with overloaded RT tasks, and so on. Note, after the first CPU starts this process, if another CPU wanted to do a pull, it would see that the process has already begun and would only increment a counter to have the IPIs continue again. The RT_PUSH_IPI solved the latency problem with PREEMPT_RT but could cause a new issue with non PREEMPT_RT. Namely, softirqs run in a threaded context on PREEMPT_RT but they can run in an interrupt context in non-RT. If an IPI lands on a CPU that has just woken up multiple RT tasks and the current CPU is running a non RT or a low priority RT task, instead of doing a push, it would simply do a schedule on that CPU. But if a softirq was also executing on this CPU, the schedule would need to wait until the softirq finished. Until then, the CPU would still be considered overloaded as there are RT tasks still waiting to run on it. A live lock occurred on a workload that was doing heavy networking traffic on a large machine where the softirqs would run 500us out of 750us. And it would also be waking up RT tasks, causing the RT pull logic to be constantly executed. When a softirq triggered on a CPU with RT tasks queued but not running yet, and the other CPUs would see this CPU as being overloaded, they would send an IPI over to it. The CPU would notice that the waiting RT tasks are of higher priority than the currently running task and simply schedule that CPU instead. But because the softirq was executing, before it could schedule, it would receive another IPI to do the same. The amount of IPIs would slow down the currently running softirq so much that before it could return back to task context, it would execute another softirq never allowing the CPU to schedule. This live locked that CPU. As RT_PUSH_IPI was created to help PREEMPT_RT, make it default off if PREEMPT_RT is not enabled.

The web management interface of Tycon Systems TPDIN-Monitor-WEB2  does not perform server-side validation of credentials during the login process. By submitting empty values for both credential fields, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the authentication check and establish a valid administrative session. This grants full access to device controls including power relay management, device reboot, remote access service configuration, and network settings, which could allow an attacker to disrupt connected infrastructure or cause physical damage to equipment.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired() checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry that was moved to this list. Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock. Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops queues.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees. But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size. However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract. Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact check for whether the requested size is tracked. We don't need to care if red zoning is also enabled or not. Also update and expand the comment accordingly.